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NICE TIE: TRADE DRESS PROTECTION FOR VISUAL
ARTISTIC STYLE WHEN COMPETITORS OFFER
ARTIST-INSPIRED PRODUCTS
Andrew J. Noreuil*
It is important to be as sensitive to the artist of the past as to the
contemporary artist, not to misrepresent the past, not to turn the
past to purely commercial ends.'
INTRODUCTION
More than a few people have gone to an art museum and wanted to
walk out with a few choice pieces. Unfortunately, due to record-set-
ting prices at recent art auctions in New York, not everyone will be
able to afford to take home her very own Old Master painting.2 But
all is not lost. There is still a way to purchase the work of one's favor-
ite artist without having an eight-figure market portfolio. The solu-
tion for the shopper of nonextraordinary means is art merchandise.3
Art merchandise is the broad term for the category of products that
incorporate the features of an artist's work into a consumer product.
More than just posters of famous paintings, art merchandise has ex-
ploded into almost all areas of consumer goods.4 The vast variety of
* I thank Professor Hugh Hansen for his suggestions and guidance in the prepa-
ration of this Note. I am also grateful to Marilyn Goldberg for her insights into the
art licensing industry.
1. Gail Gregg, From Bathers to Beach Towels, ARTnews, Apr. 1997, at 120, 123
(quoting Marcia ficker, Director of New York's New Museum of Contemporary Art,
commenting on the growth of art merchandising operations run by museums).
2. See Carol Vogel, A Cdzanne Leads a $128 Million Auction of the Whitney Art
Collection, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1999, at B3; Carol Vogel, Van Gogh Self-Portrait Sells
for $71.5 Million, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1998, at Bi; see also Ann E. Berman, Auction
Season Makes a New Impression, Wall St. J., May 21, 1998, at A15 (reporting that in
the 1998 spring auctions, Monet's The Grand Canal sold for $12.1 million and Andy
Warhol's Orange Marilyn commanded a price of $17.3 million).
3. See Marsha Miro, Artistic License, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 22, 1993, at 1G.
Jennifer Burke, an assistant manager of a satellite store of the Detroit Institute of Art,
explained that one of the virtues of art merchandise is that it allows shoppers to recall
the art that they have seen at prices that they can afford: "Ve cross the barrier where
[shoppers] feel everything (in art) is too expensive for them. We have items from $3
to $1500. People like that they can actually afford something here." Id. At one of the
satellite stores run by New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, the prices range
from $1.50 to $3000. See Lila Corn, Shoppers Discover the Art of Retail, Bus. News
N.J., Jan. 24, 1996, at 9.
4. Examples of product lines in which art merchandise is marketed include: ce-
ramics, carpeting, tapestries, glassware, jewelry, flatware, tableware, furniture, fine
porcelain figurines, cosmetics, luggage, food, linens, and clothing. Examples of art
merchandise products include: wall hangings, puzzles, notecards, postcards, lighters,
watches, pens, ties, scarves, eyeglasses, T-shirts, hats, cosmetic cases, handbags, bed
sheets, chocolates, wine bottles and labels, dining room tables, and cigar humidors.
Telephone Interview with Marilyn Goldberg, Artist Estate Licensing Agent in New
York City (Dec. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Goldberg Interview]. Among the artists who
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products includes the familiar Monet neckties, 5 Caillebotte umbrel-
las,6 and almost anything featuring Picasso.7 But there are also Cd-
zanne beach towels,8 Rodin "Thinker" pastas,9 Winslow Homer credit
cards,1" Piet Mondrian ready-to-wear dresses," and even blow-up
dolls of Edvard Munch's famous "cheek-clasping, gape-mouthed
wraith from his painting The Scream. 12 While some art merchandise
is based on work that is in the public domain, a great deal of it is
licensed.'3 In 1998, sales of licensed art products totaled $5.4 billion. 4
While the works of famous artists are being licensed to manufacturers,
however, another line of products has also entered the art merchan-
dise market: artist-inspired products. By marketing artist-inspired
products that imitate the visual styles of artists who already have a
market presence, the products' manufacturers threaten the goodwill
and reputation that the artists have built up over a lifetime.
This Note examines how federal trademark law can be applied to
protect an artist's visual style when a third party seeks to appropriate
that style and use it to sell art merchandise. Part I discusses how art
have licensed their images and names are Marc Chagall, Jasper Johns, Pablo Picasso,
Joan Mir6, Frank Stella, Mark Rothko, and Jackson Pollock. See Finding Rights Hold-
ers for Painters, Paintings Is a Fine Art, Licensing Letter, June 1994, at 6, 6 [hereinaf-
ter Finding Rights].
5. See Alan G. Artner, Artistic License: By Making Souvenirs of Monet Lamps
and Caillebotte Umbrellas, Do Museums Cheapen Priceless Works of Art?, Chi. Trib.,
July 20, 1995, § 5 (Tempo), at 1 (stating that the Art Institute of Chicago offered more
than 60 products in connection with its Monet retrospective); see also Diane White,
Keeping Your Head Above the Waterlillies, Boston Globe, Sept. 21, 1998, at C7 (ob-
serving that in connection with the Museum of Fine Art's Monet exhibit, store pa-
trons could purchase wristwatches, Christmas balls, flower and seed mixtures, aprons,
placemats, pillows, hostess serving trays, pencil caddies, bottle stoppers, children's
books, accordian files, bridge sets, salt and pepper shakers, and T-shirts).
6. See Christine Temin, The Homer Visa: Is It to the MFA's Credit?, Boston
Globe, Feb. 28, 1996, at 73 (stating that item features the artist's Paris Street; Rainy
Day).
7. Goldberg Interview, supra note 4 (noting that Pablo Picasso is, by far, the
most recognizable and marketable artist due to the quantity of work he produced and
the variety of styles he employed).
8. See Carol Strickland, More Registers Ring in Museum Shops as Art Merchan-
dising Becomes Widespread, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 19, 1997, at 10, 10 [hereinaf-
ter Strickland, More Registers Ring] (describing towels featuring the artist's Bathers).
9. See Deni Kasrel, Phila. Bus. J., Museums Cash in on Retail, June 20, 1997, at 1
(observing that the label on the package says "food to think about").
10. See Temin, supra note 6 (reporting that Winslow Homer's painting Boys in a
Pasture will now be featured on a Visa card issued by BayBank).
11. See Chuck Twardy, Pop Goes the Easel, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.),
May 5, 1996, at G1 (reporting that in the 1970s, New York's Metropolitan Museum of
Art was criticized for selling the garments that featured the rectangles and primary
colors of the artist's work).
12. See id. (reporting that the item's package touts it as an "icon of angst").
13. An example of art merchandise based on public domain art is a plate with a
depiction of Raphael's angels.
14. See Trademark/Brand Licensing Paces Business in '98: U.SjCanada Sales
Overall Fall 3%, Licensing Letter, Jan. 4, 1999, at 1, 4 (reporting that art licensing
revenues in 1998 are up from $4.4 billion in 1992).
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merchandise has become a lucrative industry in recent years and the
manner in which art is marketed to the general public. Part II outlines
the origin of trademark law and the policies that support it. This part
also examines the development of federal trade dress doctrine. Part
III analyzes how an artist can use federal trade dress doctrine to pre-
vent third parties from using her visual style on art merchandise. This
part explains how a visual artistic style can indicate that a particular
artist is the source or sponsor of goods, and how, by appropriating the
artist's visual style, a third party causes confusion in the minds of pur-
chasers and viewers as to the source or sponsorship of goods.
I. THE ART OF MERCHANDISING
This part explains how art is merchandised and identifies recent de-
velopments in this burgeoning industry. In addition, this part exam-
ines the process for licensing artwork for use in merchandising efforts
and focuses on the reasons why a manufacturer would consider creat-
ing an artist-inspired product.
A. The Rise of an Industry
Art merchandising is not a new phenomenon in museums. In 1871,
New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art (the "Met") became the
first American museum to sell art merchandise. 15 Serious museum
merchandising efforts, however, did not begin until over 100 years
later. In the late 1970s, "The Treasures of Tutankhamen" show visited
the Met, and museum merchandising was taken to a new level.' 6 The
Tutankhamen show proved that a museum exhibit could not only be
popular, but profitable as well.' 7 Since then, almost every major mu-
seum has entered into the market."8 While museums have offered less
15. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Art(?) to Go: Museum Shops Broaden Wares, at a
Profit, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 10, 1997, at Al; see also Lisa W. Foderaro, The Met Pio-
neered with Reproductions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1997, at B5 (stating that even before
the Met's founding trustees had a building, they bought 174 old master paintings from
Europe and commissioned engravers to make etchings of ten of them); Carol Strick-
land, Art of the Deak One Museum's History of Merdandising, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, June 19, 1997, at 12, 12 (observing that, in 1871, before the Met officially opened
its doors in a former dancing school, it was selling a portfolio of Old Master engrav-
ings for $25 a set).
16. See Artner, supra note 5; wardy, supra note 11.
17. See Twardy, supra note 11.
18. Even the Vatican Museum has licensed images of its tapestries to be repro-
duced in rugs marketed to consumers as home furnishings. See Penny Gill, Perfect
Partnership Key to Handmade Rug Success, Home Furnishings Newspaper, Oct. 5,
1998, at 56. In addition, the Vatican has granted a Pittsburgh businessman the world-
wide distribution rights for Vatican Museum products. See Johnna A. Pro, Museum
Sales to Help Vatican, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jun. 13, 1996, at Al (reporting that the
entrepreneur believes that "it will ultimately be a billion-dollar-a-year business");
Cristina Rouvalis, Museum Shops Find History Can Bring out Shoppers, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette, Jun. 13, 1996, at A14. One of the distribution channels for the Vatican
merchandise involves having parochial school children sell the wares door-to-door.
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convincing justifications, 19 as a general matter, museums are enticed
into selling art merchandise for one reason: economics. 20 With gov-
ernment sources reducing the amount of public funding provided to
the arts, and corporate and individual donors attaching increasingly
onerous strings to their contributions, museums are turning to art
merchandising as a form of self-help.21 Revenue from art merchandis-
ing is used to bridge the gap between rising expenses and falling dona-
tions.22 As a result, museums are increasingly turning to licensing as a
way to increase art merchandise revenues.'
Art merchandising is big business for museums.24 Surveys by indus-
try groups reveal that profits from museum stores lead all other
sources of earned income.-' The Met, which has fourteen stores in the
U.S. and twenty-eight licensed stores abroad,26 had total merchandise
revenue of $87.4 million in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997.27 The
average gross profit margin on museum-marketed art merchandise is
See Stephen Baker & John Rossant, John Connelly's Holy Hook-up, Bus. Week, Oct.
7, 1996, at 64.
19. See Miro, supra note 3 (reporting that a museum executive has stated that
"[t]his is not a commercialization of art or the museum; it's a popularization, designed
to attract more people to visit"). Another museum spokesperson observed that
"there's a financial component in what we do ... but our primary desire is to have
visitors take something of the museum away with them.... And [that] gets our name
out." Artner, supra note 5. Yet another spokesperson has commented that merchan-
dising allows artists to "become better known and more accessible." Lee Siegel, Johns
Goes to Pieces, ARTnews, June 1996, at 31, 31 (quoting Elizabeth Addison, deputy
director for marketing and communication at New York Museum of Modem Art).
Those who oppose the current level of art merchandising argue that saturating the
market with such a large volume of reproductions of great works only deadens the
responses of consumers when they see the actual works of art. See Artner, supra note
5. Perhaps the most pithy observation regarding the dangers of the mass commercial-
ization of art is that "[i]t's one thing to reproduce a likeness of an artwork. It's an-
other to eat off of it." Miro, supra note 3.
20. See Gregg, supra note 1, at 123.
21. See Dobrzynski, supra note 15; Gregg, supra note 1, at 120; see also Strickland,
More Registers Ring, supra note 8, at 10 (quoting museum merchandise manager as
stating that "[m]useums are definitely depending more and more on retail sales for
revenue.").
22. See Dobrzynski, supra note 15.
23. See Museum Licensors Focus on Home Furnishings, Licensing Letter, May
1993, at 1, 8 [hereinafter Museum Licensors] (quoting a museum source as noting that
"[i]n the last 10 years there's been a tremendous proliferation of museums entering
licensing as a way to increase revenues .. "). As an alternative to licensing products
based on its collection, a museum could develop products in-house. See id.
24. See Strickland, More Registers Ring, supra note 8 (observing that in the mid-
1980s, the Museum Store Association, a nonprofit trade group, had 700 members; as
of 1997, it has 1800 members).
25. Surveys of the Association of Art Museum Directors and the American Asso-
ciation of Museums found that 18% to 26% of earned income came from art mer-
chandising. See Dobrzynski, supra note 15.
26. See Lauren Coleman-Lochner, The Color of Monet, Record (N.J.), Oct. 7,
1998, at B1.
27. See Dobrzynski, supra note 15. As of 1997, the Met sold some 20,000 different
items. See Gregg, supra note 1, at 121.
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forty-eight percent, ten percent above reputable department stores. 8
To maximize their merchandising potential, many museums have
shifted away from using volunteers to run their shops, instead opting
to enlist the services of seasoned marketing and retail professionals 2 9
The appeal of individual artists can also make for a banner year at a
museum's gift shop. For example, in 1993, the Matisse exhibit at New
York's Museum of Modem Art (the "MoMA") helped push merchan-
dising revenues to $25 million, from $16 million in 1992.30 In 1994,
revenues were back down at $18 million.31 Finally, one need not go to
a museum store to purchase art merchandise. Since 1996, several ma-
jor museums have invited QVC to feature their wares on its home
shopping television program. 2
Recent developments in art merchandising have only made the
market more competitive. For example, art merchandising is not just
restricted to museums.33 Due to the success that the museums have
realized, art merchandise is entering conventional retail distribution
channels. 34 The Museum Company, founded in 1989, sells merchan-
dise representing the collections of 200 museums worldwide.35 With
eighty-four stores in the U.S and Canada and three in Great Britain,
the company is seeking to open eight to ten additional stores each
year.36 On another front, in 1988, retail competitors lobbied Congress
to repeal the exemption in the Internal Revenue Code that allows mu-
28. See Dobrzynski, supra note 15. Net profit for the Met in 1996 was 10-12% of
gross revenue. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Museuns Step Up Their Retailing to Turn Art
into Revenue, N.Y. Tunes, Feb. 18, 1997, at B5 [hereinafter Foderaro, Museums Step].
29. See Kasrel, supra note 9 (quoting a retail consultant stating that museums now
"hire people with retail backgrounds and a diversity of skills in merchandising prod-
uct development"); Foderaro, Museums Step, supra note 28 (noting that as museum
merchandising departments have become more sophisticated, they have begun to add
retailing professionals to their staffs); see also Strickland, More Registers Ring, supra
note 8 (reporting that, in 1997, Newv York's Museum of Modem Art named James
Gundell, senior vice president and merchandise manager at Bloomingdale's, as its
director of retail operations).
30. See Foderaro, Museums Step, supra note 28.
31. See id.
32. See Gregg, supra note 1, at 120; see also Diane Haithman, Fine Art on QVC"
Museums Star on Cable "Mall", July 31, 1996, Chi. Sun-Times, at 49 (stating that the
recent joint marketing effort of QVC and the Philadelphia Museum of Art was "very
successful"); Jane L. Levere, Museuns and QVC Find They Can Do Business To-
gether by Going Beyond the Typical Art Crowd, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1997, at D7
(quoting the cautionary observation by museum official that "TV marketing of prod-
ucts has a bit of a hucksterism to it. If you embrace it wholeheartedly, you could hurt
your brand.").
33. See, e.g., Douglas Ilka, Store Carries Wacky to Artsy: From Matisse Prints to
Rubber Rats, Little Library Nook Is One Mass of Contradictions, Detroit News, Oct.
30, 1997, at C5 (stating that Matisse, Renoir, and Degas merchandise can be found at
a small library gift shop in Rochester Hills, Michigan).
34. See Finding Rights, supra note 4, at 6.
35. See Corn, supra note 3.
36. See Coleman-Lochner, supra note 26.
1999] 3407
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
seums to earn income on merchandise without paying taxes.37 Only
museum sales on merchandise that is "substantially related" to the
educational mission of the institution can qualify for this tax exempt
treatment.3 8 All other sales from merchandising operations are taxa-
ble at regular corporate tax rates.3 9 Although museums have been
accused of changing their methods of accounting to minimize their
merchandising profits on paper,4 0 Congress has thus far refused to re-
peal the exemption.4' Finally, in light of the huge increase in art mer-
chandising operations, artists and their estates are becoming more
aggressive in protecting their names and images.42
37. See Twardy, supra note 11. Testifying before a House subcommittee, William
Edwards of the Museum Company said that "[s]lick catalogs and fancy shopping
center stores do not reflect a museum's commitment to education.. .. They repre-
sent a cynical exploitation of tax laws and preferred postal rates which were designed
for a nobler purpose." Miro, supra note 3.
38. I.R.C. § 513(a) (1998).
39. See id. § 511(a); see also Foderaro, Museums Step, supra note 28 (noting that to
avail themselves of this exemption, museums put art images on their merchandise, as
merchandise that only has the museum's name or logo does not qualify for the ex-
emption). The need to prove the link between its merchandising operations and its
educational mission has prompted the Met to make a point of publicly stating that it
puts its profits from merchandising into its education budget. See Gregg, supra note 1,
at 122. For this same reason, the museum's mail-order catalogs state that the products
are "inspired by" an object in the museum. Id. In addition, on licensed products,
museums include hangtags and packaging that explain the educational significance of
the products. See Museum Licensors, supra note 23, at 8.
40. See Lee Rosenbaum, Met Shops Run Deficit (or Do They?), Art Am., Feb.
1996, at 112, 112 (stating that William Edwards, former deputy director for auxiliary
activities at the MoMA and co-founder of the Museum Company, charged that the
MoMA changed its method of accounting "because there was a fear that too much
attention was being focused on the profitability of museum shops"). Many museums
began making similar changes in their accounting systems around 1987. See, e.g.,
Robin Kamen, Competitors Pinch Met's Retail Chain, Crain's N.Y. Bus., Mar. 29-Apr.
4, 1993, at 1 (observing that, after 1987, the Met began allocating data processing and
other charges against its merchandising revenues).
41. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (1998).
42. See, e.g., David Colman, Picassos Reclaim Their Patrimony, N.Y. Times, Apr.
28, 1996, (Style) at 39 (reporting that the Picasso family is attempting to curtail the
current level of exploitation of Picasso's name and artistic images, and is spending $6
in legal fees for every $1 of royalties received); Winnie Hu, Store Wars: When a Mo-
bile Is Not a Calder, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1998, at El (stating that the Whitney Mu-
seum of American Art and two other museums have removed mobile sculptures from
their gift shops out of awareness of the concern of the Alexander Calder family that
the public would confuse the mobiles with those of Calder); Alan Riding, A Family
Feud Over a Picasso (on Wheels), N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1999, at El (reporting that the
Picasso family goes to court 20 times each year to fight commercial abuses of Picasso's
name and images); Nancy L. Ross, Artistic License, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1997, (Home)
at 4 (reporting that the Picasso family filed over a dozen suits in three years to enjoin
the use of his images on boxer shorts, tote bags, and neckties, and to have his name
removed from a red pepper pizza served at a Greenwich Village restaurant); Siegel,
supra note 19, at 31 (reporting that after learning that MoMA was selling a jigsaw
puzzle of his work Flag (1954-55), Jasper Johns grew so "disturbed" that he ordered
the museum to remove the puzzle from the shelves and incinerate the entire stock).
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B. Producing an Art Product
To produce an art product, a manufacturer can either license an art-
ist's existing artworks or pay another artist to produce images for him.
Often, when a manufacturer chooses the latter option, he seeks to
produce an artist-inspired product. This section considers both
options.
1. Licensing a Product
To lawfully market a licensed art product, a manufacturer must take
a number of steps. First, he has to determine which artist he wants to
license.43 The two major organizations that represent artists and their
estates in the United States are the Visual Artists Guild of America"
and Artists' Rights Society.4 After selecting an artist and entering
into an agreement to become the artist's licensee, he must create a
suitable product that will meet with the approval of both the source of
the reproducible art (the museum or owner of the work)46 and the
underlying rights holder (the artist, or more often, the artist's es-
tate).47 While many rights holders do not have stringent requirements
for licensed products, some are very protective of the artist's public
image.' s In addition, sources also have different standards.4 9 Most
license agreements contain provisions that require the manufacturer
43. See Finding Rights, supra note 4, at 6 (describing the necessary steps in licens-
ing an artist's work).
44. See id. The Visual Artists Guild of America was started twenty years ago and
represents over 500 American artists and estates including Jasper Johns, Grant Wood,
Maxfield Parrish, and Thomas Hart Benton. See id.
45. See id. Artists' Rights Society represents thirty U.S. artists and estates includ-
ing Jackson Pollock, Frank Stella, and Mark Rothko. See id. Through its affiliated
foreign societies, it also represents, among other artists, Joan Mir6, Marc Chagall,
Pablo Picasso, and Henri Matisse. See id.
46. See id. Sources can also be stock houses, publishers of books and posters,
galleries, and private collections. See id.
47. See id.; see also 2 Ralph E. Lerner & Judith Bresler, Art Law 1405 (2d ed.
1998) (suggesting that the artist should give written approval of not only the goods
themselves, but also all packaging, advertising, and promotional materials). If the
work has fallen into the public domain, as with artists who have been dead for over 50
years, the manufacturer must still obtain the approval of the source. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 302 (1994). Artists such as De Kooning and Balthus are in the public domain and
offer the manufacturer an alternative to using the images of artists whose work is still
under copyright. The remainder of this Note focuses not on the source of the repro-
duction, but instead on the rights holder, that is, the artist or the estate of the artist.
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. See Gregg, supra note 1, at 123 (suggesting that while products like the Cd-
zanne baseball have a market with some museums, other museums would not have
sold it). The President of the Met has stated that the museum has strict guidelines
regarding putting a Monet painting on a coffee mug or other such uses of its images:
"'We stick to the high end,' he says. 'A lot of other museums are going downstream,
because that's where the money is."' Id. About 20% of the merchandise in the Met's
shop is produced in the Met's own reproduction studio in New York. See Corn, supra
note 3. Most of the other products are produced by licensees, under the Met's super-
vision. See id
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to produce products in the style, appearance, and quality according to
the manufacturer's own highest production standards.50 To maximize
their market potential, artists often grant exclusive licenses to individ-
ual manufacturers for specific product categories. 51 The license agree-
ments contain representations that, subject to the grant of specific
rights in the agreement, the artist is the sole and exclusive owner of all
merchandising rights in his work and that the artist owns the copyright
to the work. 2 Once the product has been approved, the manufacturer
must make payments to both the source and the rights holder. 3 The
fees paid to the source and the rights holder can be structured as flat
fees or royalties based on a percentage of the revenue generated from
sales of the product.5 4 Royalties generally range from two to twenty
percent,5 5 with ten percent being standard.5 6
2. Artist-Inspired Products
Given the creative, legal, and financial requirements involved in li-
censing an art product, there is tremendous incentive for manufactur-
ers to avoid these steps and simply market products that do not
require compliance with the time-consuming and expensive art licens-
ing process. It is at this point that some manufacturers have entered
the art merchandise market with "artist-inspired products" ("AIPs").
A manufacturer creates an AIP when he designs a product resulting in
a new image that incorporates in its rendition the visual style of an
artist with whom he does not have a license agreement. For example,
one manufacturer may license the image of Jackson Pollock's Blue
50. See Marilyn Moore, A Guide to Licensing Artwork 53-54 (1996).
51. See id. at 45-46. By granting exclusive licenses by product category, artists can
choose the manufacturers who are most successful in each market in order to maxi-
mize their profit potential. See id.; see also 2 Lerner & Bresler, supra note 47, at 1404
(stating that the goods in connection with the license should be defined as narrowly as
possible; for example, an artist who wants to license a work for posters and paper
plates should enter separate agreements with different manufacturers instead of
granting a license to a single manufacturer for "paper goods").
52. See 2 Lerner & Bresler, supra note 47, at 1404. Other provisions in the agree-
ment address the artist's right to be indemnified for any liability incurred relating to
the merchandising of the works that are subject to the agreement, the term and terri-
tory of the agreement, and the artist's right to an accounting of profits. See id. at 1405.
53. See id. at 1404 (noting that often an upfront fee is paid to the artist on the
signing of the license agreement); Finding Rights, supra note 4, at 6.
54. See Moore, supra note 50, at 48-52. As a general matter, licensing for publish-
ing rights is remunerated on a flat fee basis while merchandise licensing usually in-
volves a royalty. See Finding Rights, supra note 4, at 6. Some of the sales bases used
to calculate royalties include the retail price of the product sold, the net selling price
(the price charged to wholesalers), and net receipts (retail price of product less selling
discounts and promotions). See Moore, supra note 50, at 51.
55. See Moore, supra note 50, at 52. Factors that determine the royalty rate in-
clude the underlying sales base for calculation of the royalty, the market, the industry,
the product category, and the value of the work to the manufacturer. See id.
56. See Finding Rights, supra note 4, at 6.
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Poles"7 and create a silk scarf depicting that image. This is a legitimate
licensing of an art product. A second manufacturer, however, may
create a silk scarf with an image that is done in Pollock's "drip and
splat" style.58 While the image depicted is not one of Pollock's works,
it would be in Pollock's style and, short of comparing it to a catalog of
all of Pollock's works, could be mistaken as a depiction of an actual
Pollock work. The incentives for the manufacturer are obvious. He
can avoid getting the approval of the artist's estate and the source of
the art because he is not depicting the actual work of the artist. In
addition, royalties need not be paid, and quality control is not an
issue.
Most AIPs are created by in-house artists who work for the manu-
facturer.5 9 These artists are educated in the style of the artist used for
inspiration (the "inspiring artist"), and they often incorporate into the
depiction not only the style of the inspiring artist, but the artist's
choice of subject matter as well.1. Not surprisingly, manufacturers al-
most always create AIPs in the styles of inspiring artists who have
already had a significant product presence in the market.6" AIPs are
often sold through the same distribution channels as licensed art prod-
ucts, and while some AlPs are priced below comparable licensed art
products by an inspiring artist, many are in the same price range as
legitimately licensed art products.6' AIPs are produced for the same
products for which the inspiring artist has already established a li-
censed product (e.g., AIP necktie competing with a necktie licensed
by the inspiring artist), as well as for products that the inspiring artist
has yet to license (AIP mousepad with no competition from a compa-
rable licensed product by the inspiring artist). 3
AIPs are packaged in various ways. Some refer to the inspiring art-
ist on the packaging or on the label.6' They may reveal their nature
by referring to the inspiring artist with phrases such as "inspired by,"
"apres," or "homage to." Other AIPs do not indicate whether they
57. National Gallery of Australia, Canberra (1952).
58. See Sarah Boxer, The Photos that Changed Pollock's Life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
1998, at El (discussing the processes used by Pollock in creating this style and recent
revelations about those processes).
59. See Goldberg Interview, supra note 4.
60. See id. The use of identical subject matter, however, is not a necessary re-
quirement of creating an AIP. Of course, it may be argued that every artist has been
inspired by the works of another artist at some point in her career, even if the source
of the inspiration is not obvious. For example, Alexander Calder was inspired to cre-
ate his mobiles after visiting the studio of Piet Mondrian and viewing Mondrian's
proto-installation art comprised of squares of colored paper pinned to the walls. See
Roberta Smith, All Calder, High and Low, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1998, at E35. The
kind of "inspiration" that is present in AlPs however, is simply that of a conscious
effort to create a work that appears to have been created by the inspiring artist.
61. See Goldberg Interview, supra note 4.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id
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are actual depictions of the inspiring artist's work.65 One common
thread is that few, if any, AlPs admit their "inspired by" provenance
on the front of the product or in a manner that a third party, observing
the product in use, would be aware of such provenance.66
Despite the protection afforded under copyright law, artists need
additional protection in cases involving AIPs. While copyright law
protects an artist from having her actual works appropriated, it will
not protect the artist when a party is using her visual style (and not
her works) to market products to the general public. 67 A number of
articles have addressed the issue of whether an artist can protect the
visual style in her works (i.e., her actual paintings or sculptures),68 but
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Copyright law defines a "derivative work" as "any ... form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). While this protec-
tion may prevent a party from creating a work that is derivative of the artist's actual
work (e.g., a certain painting), it does not provide protection for the artist's overall
style used in her oeuvre. Therefore, a party could use an artist's visual style and still
avoid violating the copyright law's derivative work doctrine simply by changing the
subject matter of the work.
68. See, e.g., Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and
Post-Modernism, 11 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1 (1992) (urging reformulation of the
Copyright Act's creativity and originality standards when applied to the visual arts);
Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use De-
fense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 373 (1993) (examining the Second
Circuit's decision in Rogers v. Koons and concluding that the new standard enunci-
ated for using the fair use defense unnecessarily imposes new burdens on the visual
artist seeking to use such defense); Judith B. Prowda, Application of Copyright and
Trademark Law in the Protection of Style in the Visual Arts, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. &
Arts 269 (1995) (urging restraint in the application of copyright and trademark pro-
tection to visual artistic style); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 249 (1997) (proposing that artists be afforded the freedom to copy
"anything and everything" from other works of art subject to the limitation that the
new art posed no competitive threat to the copied work of art); Michelle Brownlee,
Note, Safeguarding Style: What Protection Is Afforded to Visual Artists by the Copy-
right and Trademark Laws?, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1157 (1993) (recognizing trademark
and copyright protection of visual artistic style and proposing a different standard of
copyright infringement that aims to protect the style of visual works); William P. Fitz-
patrick, Note, The Hazards of Extending Copyright or Trademark Protection to an
Artist's Visual Style, 17 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 453 (1993) (reviewing copyright and
trademark arguments for protecting artistic style and arguing that attempts to extend
artists' property rights beyond their actual works to protection of their visual style
risks accelerating the depletion of ideas in the public domain); Christopher Man,
Note, The Scope of Intellectual Property's Protection of Stylistic Rights, 47 Wash. U. J.
Urb. & Contemp. L. 1995, 213 (1995) (arguing that courts should curtail the recent
explosion of artistic rights by tailoring the rights to the goals of the privacy, trade-
mark, unfair competition, and copyright laws that protect them); Lori Petruzzelli,
Comment, Copyright Problems in Post-Modern Art, 5 DePaul J. Art & Ent. L., 115
(1995) (suggesting that the Copyright Act should not be changed to accommodate the
specific problems created by post-modem art); Mark Traphagen, Stretching the Can-
vas: Protection of Visual Artistic Styles in Works of Fine Art Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act Ent. & Sports Law, Summer 1992, at 3 (arguing that claims of trade
infringement by artists against other artists should be dismissed unless the allegedly
infringing work itself is explicitly misleading to the public).
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the issue of whether an artist can protect her style when applied to
unlicensed art merchandise has not yet been addressed.69 Part II ex-
amines trademark law and the steps that a plaintiff seeking to protect
her trademark must take to obtain this protection.
I. THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS
This part begins by looking at the general law of trademarks and its
purposes. This part then examines the elements required to sustain a
claim of trade dress infringement.
A. Generally
The law of trademarks is one subset of the broader category of law
known as unfair competition.7 ° Trademark law is based on "It]he pol-
icy of consumer protection, property rights, economic efficiency and
universal concepts of justice .... ,71 From an economic standpoint,
trademarks enable purchasers to identify goods and services that they
have found satisfactory in the past and reject goods and services that
they have found unsatisfactory.7 This process of identifying goods
69. But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Exploiting the Artist's Commercial Identity: The
Merchandizing of Art Images, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1 (1995) (offering prelimi-
nary observations regarding copyright and trademark issues implicated in the mer-
chandizing of images drawn from or inspired by works of popular artists).
70. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,413 (1916) ("IThe
common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition.").
The Senate also recognized the nature of trademark law when it reported the bill that
became the Lanham Act. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 ("There is no essential difference between trade-mark in-
fringement and what is loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition is the
genus of which trade-mark infringement is one of the species."). The Supreme Court
has stated that "[tjhe law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of
deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source."
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989).
71. See 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition,§ 2:2, at 2-3 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter McCarthy]; see also Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. c (1995) (discussing numerous policies that justify the
protection of trademarks). The Senate stated in its report on the Lanham Act that
"[t]o protect trade-marks ... is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair compe-
tition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and
good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those
who have not." S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1275.
72. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1275 (observing that trademarks "make possible a choice between competing articles
by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other"); 1 McCarthy, supra note 71,
§ 2:3, at 2-3 to -4. Judge Augustus Hand explained the nature and scope of trademark
law:
A trade-mark is not property in the ordinary sense but only a word or sym-
bol indicating the origin of a commercial product. The owner of the mark
acquires the right to prevent the goods to which the mark is applied from
being confused with those of others and to prevent his own trade from being
diverted to competitors through their use of misleading marks. There are no
rights in a trade-mark beyond these.
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and services with trademarks creates goodwill.73 An owner of good-
will is entitled to relief when another party seeks to use the owner's
goodwill to his own advantage.74 Put simply, a trademark "is merely a
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in
trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial sig-
nature-upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold."75
The main federal statute protecting trademarks is the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946.76 Traditionally, trademark protection was af-
Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Duchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937).
73. Justice Frankfurter once defined trademark law as follows:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that
we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led
to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the
aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential cus-
tomers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this
is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the
owner can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
Commenting on the importance of protecting trademarks, Justice Holmes stated that
a trademark "stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods."
A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
74. Justice Pitney described the nature of a trademark action as follows:
The redress that is accorded in trade-mark cases is based upon the party's
right to be protected in the good-will of a trade or business. The primary
and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or ownership of
the article to which it is affixed. Where a party has been in the habit of
labeling his goods with a distinctive mark, so that purchasers recognize
goods thus marked as being of his production, others are debarred from ap-
plying the same mark to goods of the same description, because to do so
would in effect represent their goods to be of his production and would tend
to deprive him of the profit he might make through the sale of the goods
which the purchaser intended to buy. Courts afford redress or relief upon
the ground that a party has a valuable interest in the good-will of his trade or
business, and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and extend it. The
essence of the wrong consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or
vendor for those of another.
Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. at 412-13 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit
has recognized that "[t]he trademark laws are designed not only to prevent consumer
confusion but also to protect 'the synonymous right of a trademark owner to control
his product's reputation."' Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema,
Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the
Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976)). The Senate Report on adopting
the Lanham Act states that "[a] trademark.., gives the right to prohibit the use of it
so far as to protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his."
S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (quoting
Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)).
75. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). The first federal trademark protection statute
was enacted in 1870. See An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes relat-
ing to Patents and Copyrights, Law of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84.
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forded only to "fanciful or arbitrary words and symbols."' One of
the major strengths of the Lanham Act is that it was the first federal
statute to prohibit deceptive marketing by proscribing the use of false
designations and misrepresentations. 78 This innovation was accom-
pushed through section 43(a) of the Act, which states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designa-
tion of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall
be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is or is likely to be damaged by such act.79
By enacting section 43(a), Congress provided for statutory protection
that goes beyond registered marks by extending coverage to qualify-
ing unregistered marks.'0 The Supreme Court has stated that § 43(a)
The Lanham Act replaced the Trademark Act of 1905. See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3
(1946), 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274-76. For a general discussion of the history of trade-
mark legislation, see Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. e (1995); 1
McCarthy, supra note 71, §§ 5:3-5:4, at 5-6 to -13.
77. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. g (1995). For examples of
various subject matter that have been protected by trademark doctrine, see generally
1 McCarthy, supra note 71, ch. 7.
78. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. e (1995); see also Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S 763, 767-68 (1992) ("The Lanham Act was
intended to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks' and 'to pro-
tect persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competition.'" (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)); S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 (explaining that § 43(a) was re-
worded "to codify the interpretation it has been given by the courts. Because Section
43(a) of the Act fills an important gap in federal unfair competition law, the commit-
tee expects the courts to continue to interpret the section."); 1 McCarthy, supra note
71, § 5:9, at 5-17 (stating that the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 codified the
case law that had developed under § 43(a) and amounted to Congress approving of
the use § 43(a) as the "premier federal vehicle" for the protection of unregistered
marks).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
80. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844. 858 (1982) (observing
that section 43(a) "prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32," which ap-
plies to registered marks); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 60S
(7th Cir. 1986) ("[IThe statute is not limited to trademark infringement and in any
event protects unregistered (common law) trademarks as well as federally registered
trademarks .... "); Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126,
1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Courts have long recognized that recovery under § 43(a) is
not restricted to federally registered trademarks, but extends to 'words, symbols, col-
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"protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general
principles qualifying a mark for registration under section 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether
an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under section 43(a)." 81
Over time, the trademark protection afforded to words and symbols
that indicated the origin or source of a product was extended to in-
clude the source-indicating trade dress of a product.82 For purposes of
the Lanham Act, trade dress is treated the same as a trademark.83 In
addition, unregistered trade dress owners are entitled to the same
remedies that are available to holders of registered trademarks. 84 Tra-
ditionally, trade dress doctrine protected the overall appearance of
the wrappers, labels, and containers that were used to package a prod-
uct.8 5 Recent developments in trade dress law, however, have ex-
panded its coverage.86 Trade dress has been described as "essentially
[a product's] total image and overall appearance."'  Trade dress has
also been defined as "involv[ing] the total image of a product and may
include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, tex-
ture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques."8 8 Recent deci-
lections of colors and designs, or advertising materials or techniques' that the purchas-
ing public has come to associate with a single source." (quoting RJR Foods, Inc. v.
White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1059 (2d Cir. 1979)) (emphasis omitted)).
81. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (citation omitted). Section 2 of the Lanham Act
states that "nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f).
82. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. g (1995).
83. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773 ("§ 43(a) provides no basis for distinguishing
between trademark and trade dress"); Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d
863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The difference between trade dress and trademark is no
longer of importance in determining whether trade dress is protected by federal
law."): Blau Plumbing, 781 F.2d at 608 ("[C]ourts have generally not thought it im-
portant whether trade dress is a form of trademark; but it is . . ").
84. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (codifying as remedies for violation of section
43(a): injunctive relief, entitlement to defendant's profits, any damages sustained by
plaintiff, the costs of the action, reasonable attorney's fees, and destruction of the
infringing articles).
85. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 16 cmt. a (1995); see also
Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1438 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that "'[t]rade dress' originally referred to the packaging or displays associated
with trademarked goods"); 1 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 8:4, at 8-10 to -15 (discussing
the evolution of the concept of "trade dress").
86. Over time, trade dress has expanded into "the totality of any elements in
which a product or service is packaged or presented." 1 McCarthy, supra note 71,
§ 8:1, at 8-2. From this definition, courts have further defined trade dress to "encom-
pass ... the shape and design of the product itself." Id. For additional discussion of
this development, see id. §§ 8:4-8:5, at 8-10 to -17.
87. Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989).
The Eighth Circuit described trade dress as "the total image of a product, the overall
impression created, not the individual features." Woodsmith Publ'g Co. v. Meredith
Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
88. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764 n.1 (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Coin-
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sions have extended trade dress protection to, among other things, the
appearance of a lamp,8 9 the use of a lighthouse in the design of a hole
on a golf course,90 the layout of a magazine cover,91 the layout and
decor of a restaurant,92 and the appearance of a video game console. 3
Not surprisingly, the extension of trade dress to so many diverse forms
has led to some backlash.94
B. The Elements of a Section 43 Claim
The protection of an unregistered trade dress is clearly within the
scope of section 43(a). 95 The elements of a claim for trade dress in-
fringement under section 43(a) are well-established: a plaintiff must
prove that (1) her trade dress is distinctive, and (2) a likelihood of
confusion exists between her product and the defendant's. 6 Even if
petition § 16 cmt. a (1995) (stating that "[s]ource significance may attach... to the
overall appearance of a product or its packaging"). The Senate Report for the 1988
amendment of the Lanham Act states that in amending the definition of "trademark,"
the words "symbol or device" were purposely retained "so as not to preclude the
registration of colors, shapes, sounds or configurations where they function as trade-
marks." S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 44 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607.
89. See Bauer Lamp Co. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1167 (lth Cir. 1991).
90. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1577 (S.D. Tex.
1996).
91. See Time Inc. Magazine Co. v. Globe Communications Corp., 712 F. Supp.
1103, 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Sterling House, Inc. v. Dell Publ'g. Co., 174 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 299, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
92. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65; Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others,
Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1987).
93. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 (4th Cir. 1986). For
additional examples and discussion of other forms of dress to which courts have ex-
tended trade dress protection, see 1 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 8:4, at 8-10 to -15.
94. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1106 (2d Cir. 1995)
(ruling, in a case that involved the appearance of sweaters, that decorative or aes-
thetic product feature is not used to identify source); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger,
Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding, in a case that involved
greeting cards, that a "general idea" is generic and therefore cannot be eligible for
trademark protection); Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1452
(3d Cir. 1994) (establishing, in a case that dealt with the appearance of Grecian urns,
a more stringent test for inherent distinctiveness of product shapes); see also Tom W.
Bell, Virtual Trade Dress: A Very Real Problem, 56 Md. L Rev. 384,425 (1997) (argu-
ing that trade dress protection should not be afforded where the features that consti-
tute the trade dress are the very features of the product that consumers value); David
Klein, The Ever Expanding Section 43(a): Will the Bubble Burst?, 2 U. Bait. Intell.
Prop. LJ., 65, 88 (1993) (arguing that the scope of trade dress protection has unac-
ceptably expanded to become a substitute for copyright and patent protection).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994); Tvo Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775 (finding that "nonfunc-
tional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a)"); Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995); Paddington Corp. v.
Attiki Importers & Distrib., 996 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that "trade
dresses are protectable under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act").
96. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769; Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 58 F.3d at 1502-
03; Jeffrey Milstein, Inc., 58 F.3d at 31; Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780,
783 (8th Cir. 1995); Duraco Prods., 40 F.3d at 1439; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mc-
Neil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (2d Cir. 1992); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,
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the plaintiff meets her burden, the defendant will not be liable if the
plaintiffs trade dress is functional.97 A feature is functional if it is
"essential to the use or purpose" of an article, or if it "affects the cost
or quality of the article." 98
1. Source Identification
The first requirement a plaintiff must meet to assert a claim for
trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act is to prove that the
trade dress is distinctive, 99 i.e., it is indicative of the source of a prod-
uct. 100 The test used to determine the distinctiveness of a trademark
was outlined by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc. 1 ' The Abercrombie test established categories based on
the level of distinctiveness of a mark."° The categories, in order of
increasing distinctiveness, are: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) sugges-
tive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.' 3 Marks that are classified as ge-
neric indicate the genus to which the product belongs and, therefore,
can never be indicative of source.'0 4 Suggestive and arbitrary or fanci-
ful marks, at the very least, require "imagination, thought and percep-
tion to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods"10 5 and are,
886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1989); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 978 (11th
Cir. 1986).
97. See supra note 96. The burden of proving that a trade dress is functional, and
therefore not eligible for protection, is on the defendant. See Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d
at 1005 (citing Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Systems, Inc., 999
F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir. 1993)); Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 58 F.3d at 1503; Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 520 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (quoting
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). For further
discussion of functionality, see infra notes 232-33.
99. See supra note 96.
100. A trademark is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combi-
nation thereof' used by a person "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, includ-
ing a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown." 15 U.S.C § 1127. The Supreme
Court has stated that "it is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregis-
tered trademarks and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration
under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether
an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a)." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at
768.
101. 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976). In Two Pesos, the Supreme Court cited the
Abercrombie test with approval for purposes of classifying the distinctiveness of a
trade dress. See 505 U.S. at 768. But see Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1441 (rejecting the Aber.
crombie taxonomy in cases where the court is considering the trade dress of a product
configuration).
102. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 9-10. Examples of generic marks include "Cereal," "Dog Food," and
"Hammer" as applied to those respective products.
105. Id. at 11. An example of a fanciful mark is a coined word that did not exist
before it was used in connection with the goods. Words such as "Kleenex" and "Jell-
0" are fanciful marks. Arbitrary marks are words that are used in connection with
goods where the nature of the goods is not implied by the mark. Examples of arbi-
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therefore, deemed inherently distinctive (automatically satisfying the
requirement of distinctiveness).0 6 Finally, marks that are merely de-
scriptive are not deemed to be inherently distinctive, but can acquire
distinctiveness (and indicate source) if they become distinctive of the
party's goods through use in commerce. 10 7 The process of descriptive
marks becoming distinctive through use in commerce is referred to as
acquiring "secondary meaning."'0 8 Courts have found that proof of a
defendant's copying can be sufficient, in and of itself, to establish sec-
ondary meaning because there is no reason to copy a nonfunctional
feature other than to capitalize on already existing secondary mean-
ing. 0 9 While some circuits had previously required a plaintiff claim-
ing a trade dress violation under section 43(a) to prove secondary
meaning," 0 the Supreme Court, in its most recent case addressing
trade dress, held that if the trade dress was proven to be inherently
distinctive, then no showing of secondary meaning was required."'
To be an indicator of source, a trade dress need not identify by
name the origin or sponsor of the product.' The use of a trade dress
trary marks are "Camel" in connection with cigarettes and "Viper" in connection with
automobiles. In contrast to arbitrary marks, suggestive marks may indirectly infer the
nature of the goods, but because the inference is only marginal, consumers will place
primary emphasis on the source-identifying significance of the mark. Examples of
suggestive marks include "Venus" in connection with beauty products and "Igloo" in
connection with portable ice chests. For additional discussion, see Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 13 cmt. c (1995).
106. See Abercronbie, 537 F.2d at 10-11.
107. See id. at 10; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1994) (declaring that "nothing in this
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has be-
come distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce"). Marks that are directly de-
scriptive of the nature of the goods are less likely to be understood by consumers as
being indicative of source and are, therefore, not inherently distinctive. See Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition § 13 cmt. c (1995). Examples of descriptive
marks are "Car-Freshener" used in connection with an automobile deodorizer and
"Sportscreme" in connection with a pain reliever for muscular injuries. See id. § 14
cmt. a.
108. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985).
Among the factors that courts have found relevant to the inquiry of whether a trade
dress has acquired secondary meaning are advertising expenditures, consumer studies,
sales success, unsolicited media coverage, attempts to plagiarize, and length and ex-
clusivity of use. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,
1041 (2d Cir. 1992).
109. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1982)
(stating that the defendant's "admission of copying is itself persuasive evidence of
secondary meaning"); Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533,
1542 (D. Col. 1986); see also M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th
Cir. 1986) (finding that intentional copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary
meaning); Harlequin Enterprs. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 950 (2d
Cir. 1981) (holding that copying is significant evidence of secondary meaning); Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 13 cmt. e, § 16 cmt. b (1995).
110. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76,79
(2d Cir. 1990); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1141 (3d Cir. 1986).
111. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 states:
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does not mean that the articles on which the dress is used were neces-
sarily manufactured by the owner of the dress.1 3 It is enough that the
goods were manufactured for the dress owner, that the dress owner
controls the production of the goods, or that the goods pass through
the dress owner's hands and that he gives the goods the benefit of his
reputation or his name and business style.114 The requirement that
the dress indicate a single source does not prevent the owner of the
dress from using the dress on an item and marketing the item through
more than one distributor. 115
2. Likelihood of Confusion
The second requirement to sustain a claim for trade dress infringe-
ment is that the plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood of
confusion." 6 The likelihood of confusion is the "likelihood that an
appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be
misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in
question.""' 7 That is, a potential purchaser may see the goods of the
defendant and possibly believe that the plaintiff is the source of the
goods."' To be confused, a consumer need not believe that the owner
of the trade dress actually manufactured the item and placed it on the
market;"19 it is enough that the public believed that the owner of the
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof-
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and ap-
plies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to iden-
tify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added); see Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communica-
tions., Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is not necessary for the public to be
aware of the name of the manufacturer which produces a product."); Mastercrafters
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464,
466 (2d Cir. 1955).
113. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th
Cir. 1963); Victor Tool & Mach. Corp. v. Sun Control Awnings, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 868,
874 (E.D. Mich. 1968), affd mem., 411 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1969).
114. See Victor Tool, 299 F. Supp. at 874.
115. See Mastercrafters, 221 F.2d at 466 (holding that more than one distributor for
Atmos clock does not violate single source requirement where ultimate source is
Swiss manufacturer).
116. See supra note 96.
117. Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam); see also Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Steel Tube & Shapes, Inc. 616 F.2d
440, 443 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing the
mark would probably assume that the product or service it represents is associated
with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark." (quot-
ing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978))).
118. See Fleishmann, 314 F.2d at 155.
119. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
204 (2d Cir. 1979).
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mark "sponsored or otherwise approved" the use of the mark on the
item at issue.' 20
The likelihood of confusion has been extended to situations where
the defendant would gain credibility in the initial phases of the sale
process even though the third party would later be able to discern the
plaintiff from the defendant. For example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pega-
sus Petroleum Corp.,' plaintiff Mobil used the familiar "flying horse"
symbol in connection with its petroleum business but not in connec-
tion with its oil trading activities." Defendant Pegasus was exclu-
sively engaged in the oil trading business and did not use the flying
horse symbol. 2" Mobil sued to enjoin Pegasus from using the mark
"Pegasus" in connection with the petroleum industry or related busi-
nesses.' 4 In affirming the district court's judgment, the Second Cir-
cuit stated that the fact there was no actual confusion between the
parties was not dispositive.1 In other words, according to the court,
the issue is not whether there is a likelihood that a third party would
do business with Pegasus, thinking it were related to Mobil.1 6 In-
stead, the touchstone is whether there was a likelihood that Pegasus
would "gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal."'12 7
Under this doctrine, a likelihood of confusion exists if the defendant
enjoys an unfair advantage by getting an opportunity to make his
pitch before the third party realizes that he is not dealing with the
plaintiff.'28
The likelihood of confusion requirement has been held to apply not
just to purchasers and potential purchasers, but also to members of
the public at large who may only see the article in use but not be
potential buyers.'2 9 The application of the likelihood of confusing the
120. lId at 205.
121. 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
122. ld. at 256. Mobil's winged horse symbol was a registered trademark. See id. at
255.
123. See id. at 256.
124. Id. at 255.
125. See id. at 259 (stating that "the absence of misdirected mail and telephone calls
between the parties, and the fact that Pegasus Petroleum must post a letter of credit
as security during its oil trading deals while Mobil need not" are not properly consid-
ered in this inquiry). The court was reviewing the fifth Polaroid factor. evidence of
actual confusion. See id. For a general discussion of the Polaroid factors, see infra
notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
126. 818 F.2d at 259.
127. Id (offering as an example a situation where "an oil trader might listen to a
cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum-an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil
trading business-when otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that Pega-
sus Petroleum is related to Mobil").
128. See id.
129. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373,382 (2d Cir.
1997) (stating that in cases where the views of third parties are related to the goodwill
of the aggrieved manufacturer, "[t]he likelihood of confusion test concerns not only
potential purchasers but also the general public"). In addition, in Syntex Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit
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public at large is called into play where the purchaser is conspiring
with the producer of the infringing item to freeride off of the trade-
mark holder's goodwill. This approach is grounded in a concept re-
ferred to by one commentator as "psychic load. ' 130 As McCarthy
notes, "a trademark not only symbolizes the good will behind the
physical product, but also the penumbra of psychological factors that
surround the product.' 131  For example, as the Second Circuit ob-
served in Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
LeCoultre Watches, Inc. ,132 "some customers would buy plaintiff's
cheaper [product] for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by
displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes would regard
as a prestigious article.' '1 3
3
To determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, courts apply
a multifactor test. The Second Circuit's test uses the eight factors set
forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Electronics Corp.'34 The Polaroid
factors are: (1) the strength of the prior owner's mark, (2) the degree
of similarity between the two marks, (3) the proximity of the products,
(4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap between the
two products, (5) actual confusion, (6) and the reciprocal of defend-
ant's good faith in adopting its own mark, (7) the quality of the de-
fendant's product, and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.135 This list
of factors, however, is not exhaustive. 3 6 Other circuits have similar
tests for determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.137
found that Congress' 1962 amendment of the "likely to confuse" language of the Lan-
ham Act "evinc[ed] a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor
simply as to source of origin." Id. at 568.
130. 1 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 2:37, at 2-68.
131. Id.
132. 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
133. Id. at 466. The court went on to say that "the likelihood of such confusion
suffices to render plaintiff's conduct actionable." Id.; see also A.T. Cross Co. v.
Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (criticizing defendant's
appeal to purchasers that donees receiving defendant's pen would think that they
were receiving a Cross pen).
134. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
135. See id. at 495. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973
F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
136. See Bristol-Myers, 973 F.2d at 1043; Mobil Oil, 818 F.2d at 256; Polaroid, 287
F.2d at 495.
137. The Ninth Circuit has held that the factual elements that make up the likeli-
hood of confusion include: "evidence of actual confusion, the defendant's intent in
adopting the mark, similarity of marks, similarity of goods and marketing channels,
and the strength of the mark." Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doe's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d
837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987); see Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 782 F.2d
1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986). The Seventh Circuit has stated that:
[iun assessing the likelihood of marketplace confusion, the factors to be con-
sidered include the similarity of the trade dresses, the products to which the
trade dresses are attached, the area and manner of concurrent use, the de-
gree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, the strength of the plain-
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As a practical matter, to determine if a likelihood of confusion ex-
ists, courts accord great weight to a defendant's intention to adopt the
plaintiff's trade dress.138 In addition, courts have found that intent
alone may be enough to support a finding of the likelihood of confu-
sion.'39 At the very least, if intent is proved, a presumption is raised
that a likelihood of confusion resulted. 40
For an artist to bring a claim under the Lanham Act to protect her
visual style from being used in connection with an AIP, she will have
to bring an action for trade dress infringement under section 43(a).1 a'
Essentially, an artist will argue that her style is a trade dress qualified
for protection as an unregistered mark. As such, the infringing manu-
facturer, by using the artist's trade dress to sell an ALP, is confusing
the public into thinking that the artist is the source or sponsor of the
AIP, and thereby infringing the artist's goodwill. Part III examines
how an artist will make her case.
III. APPLICATION OF THE LANHAm ACT TO
VISUAL ARTISTIC STYLE
This part first examines the inherent difficulty in defining what an
artist's visual style actually is. This part then examines how an artist
tiff's trade dress, and the actual confusion and intent on the part of the
alleged infringer to pass off the infringer's goods as those of the plaintiff.
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit
employs a "digits-of-confusion" standard, which examines "similarity of products,
identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of advertising media, type (i.e.,
strength) of trademark or trade dress, defendant's intent, similarity of design, and
actual confusion." Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,430 (5th Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
138. Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 845-46 (noting that courts accord such weight to this
evidence because a defendant is presumed to accomplish his goal of adopting the
plaintiff's trade dress).
139. See Sno-Wizard Mfg. Inc. v. Eisemann Products Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th
Cir. 1986) (citing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d
695, 704 (5th Cir. 1981)).
140. See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 127-28 (2d Cir.
1998); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 586 (2d
Cir. 1993); Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 846 n.11; Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting
Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing cases); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 158 (9th Cir. 1963); see also M. Kramer Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.24 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing in dictum that,
according to McCarthy, courts "almost unanimously presume a likelihood of confu-
sion based upon a showing that the defendant intentionally copied the plaintiff's
trademark or trade dress").
141. While trade dresses can be registered, it is presumed that an artist has not
registered her visual style with the Patent and Trademark Office. For examples of
trade dresses that have been registered, see In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474
F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (allowing registration of package design of candy bar); In
re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (approving the registration of design of
label on can); In re Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958) (register-
ing the shape of a whisky bottle).
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would proceed under the Lanham Act to protect her trade dress from
infringement by the producer of an AIP.
A. What Is Style?
It has been observed that, "[o]bviously, subject is what is said, style
is how.' 1 42 This aphorism, however, does not readily apply to nonlit-
eral expression. 143 The word "style" is derived from the Latin word
stilus, which denoted the needle that was used to write on wax-coated
tablets at antiquity.'" Explaining the etymology of "style," H.W. Jan-
son wrote that "originally, it referred to distinctive ways of writing-
the shape of the letters as well as the choice of words., 45 To have
style, a thing must "not be inconsistent within itself-that it must have
an inner coherence, or unity, that it possess a sense of wholeness, of
being all of a piece.' 46 As for the elements of style, another com-
mentator writes that a property "counts as stylistic only when it associ-
ates a work with one rather than another artist.' 1 47
In the visually artistic sense, "style" has been defined many ways. 148
One proffered definition is that "style means the particular way in
which the forms that make up any given work of art are chosen and
fitted together.' 1 49 Other definitions emphasize "a coherence of qual-
ities"' 50 or "a distinctive manner or mode."''1  A more metaphorical
142. Nelson Goodman, The Status of Style, 1 Critical Inquiry 799, 799 (1975).
143. See id.
144. See 29 The Dictionary of Art 878 (Jane Turner ed., 1996) [hereinafter Diction-
ary of Art]. An alternative Latin etymology has also been offered. The Greek word
stylos was used "to denote the proportional differences between the orders of archi-
tecture." Id. at 879. While this usage is largely disregarded today, it "influenced the
English spelling of the word in the 18th century." Id. But see George Kubler, Toward a
Reductive Theory of Visual Style, in The Concept of Style 163, 166 (Berel Lang ed.,
1987) (synthesizing the dual etymology by stating that stilus has always pertained to
arts of temporal form and stylos has always related to arts of spatial organization, thus
differentiating time from space).
145. H.W. Janson, History of Art 50 (4th ed. 1991); see also 29 Dictionary of Art,
supra note 144, at 878-79 (stating that the term was first applied to first century A.D.
writings of Horace and Virgil). Another source states that "style" was first applied
metaphorically to describe "the manners of public speaking appropriate for different
occasions." Hugh Honour & John Fleming, The Visual Arts: A History 12 (1st ed.
1982).
146. Janson, supra note 145, at 50. Janson also states that "style has a way of im-
pressing itself upon us even if we do not know what particular kind of style is in-
volved." Id.
147. Goodman, supra note 142, at 807. Goodman also points out that not all
properties that indicate the maker of a work are stylistic, such as a label on a picture,
the chemical properties of the pigments in a painting, and other such documentation
that may help place origin. See id.
148. Individual style has even been defined by one scholar as "what we characteris-
tically refer to when we use the phrase 'the style of a'-where a stands in for the name
of a painter-to refer to something in the work of a." Richard Wollheim, Pictorial
Style: Two Views, in The Concept of Style, supra note 144, at 183, 184.
149. Janson, supra note 145, at 50.
150. Dictionary of Art, supra note 144, at 876.
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suggestion is that style is "a visual language with a vocabulary of
forms or motifs and a syntax governing their relationship." 151 While
delineating precisely what "style" is lends itself to artful creativity, the
term "style," as it is used in this Note, is to be understood in a more
limited sense. "Style" will refer to the visual features of an artist's
work that, considered in their totality, demonstrate a consistency and
unity in the work.'53 The reason for employing this narrow, albeit in-
complete, definition of style is a pragmatic one: in a case for trade
dress infringement, courts evaluate the total image and overall ap-
pearance that the dress creates. 54 Therefore, a more complete expli-
cation of "style" is not necessary for consideration of a suit under the
Lanham Act.
B. Step One: Source Identification
The first requirement for an artist to meet in asserting an infringe-
ment of the trade dress of her visual style under the Lanham Act is to
prove that she has a trade dress that is distinctive.'55 As a general
matter, an artist may license her images to various manufacturers for
the production of products that the artist will not actually herself pro-
duce.156 In addition, any product to which an artist licenses her work
need not identify the artist by name for the artist's trade dress to be-
come a source indicator. 157
1. Defining a Trade Dress
Before an artist can begin to argue that her visual style identifies
her as the source of goods and qualifies as a protectable trade dress,
she must expressly articulate what her trade dress is.' 58 While courts
151. Id. (citation omitted).
152. Honour & Fleming, supra note 145, at 12.
153. Of course, not all work by every artist will have a definable "style." The work
must demonstrate "consistency and unity."
154. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Part lI.B.1.
156. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
158. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373,381 (2d Cir.
1997) ("[Flocus on the overall look of a product does not permit a plaintiff to dispense
with an articulation of the specific elements which comprise its distinct dress."). For
example, the Fifth Circuit described the distinctive trade dress of a Mexican restau-
rant as:
a festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas decorated
with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The patio includes inte-
rior and exterior areas with the interior patio capable of being sealed off
from the outside patio by overhead garage doors. The stepped exterior of
the building is a festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and
neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas continue the theme.
Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991), affd,
505 U.S. 763 (1992). In holding that a plaintiff had a distinctive trade dress in its pain
reliever packaging, the Second Circuit described the trade dress as
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typically view exhibits of the parties' wares at issue in a case,159 this
requirement actually amounts to explaining in words what the artist's
style is.'16  This requirement is particularly crucial in a section 43(a)
action for an equitable remedy, because a court needs a detailed de-
scription of the plaintiff's trade dress to fashion injunctive relief that is
tailored to provide adequate protection to the trade dress owner,
without being so broad as to give the holder a monopoly in a certain
class of expression. 6'
consist[ing] of an outer carton with a solid deep blue background, white let-
tering for the name "Excedrin PM," which appears on a single line, with
"Excedrin" in lower case lettering except for the initial "E" and "PM,"
which are in capital letters. In the lower right portion of the face of the box
is a depiction of two light blue tablets, each marked "PM."
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1992).
In finding that a plaintiff had a protectable trade dress in the look of its line of greet-
ing cards, the Seventh Circuit described the trade dress as
beige, single-face (no fold) cards containing sentimental verses and fre-
quently using ellipses written in [plaintiffs] handwriting with brown ink. An
example of a verse reads: "I want to shout and tell the world how much I
love you ... but instead I'll just.., whisper." Flanking the message on the
left and right borders are a series of four stripes, two silver foil stripes envel-
oping one brown and one colored stripe in the middle. The FS cards are
displayed in a four-sided freestanding rotating rack, each side containing
eight cards of the same colored stripe displayed vertically. At the top of the
rack is a removable header bearing a sketch of [plaintiff's] likeness, her
name, and the words "'Feeling Sensitive'. . . A lost and found department
for those with feelings ... in search of the words." The backs of the FS cards
indicate that the verses are taken from [plaintiff's] book "I'll See You Some-
time ... Between Now and Soon." Each card was priced at eighty cents."
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1989).
159. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1114-17 (2d Cir. 1995)
(providing exhibits of sweaters at issue); Roulo, 886 F.2d at 943-44 (providing exhibits
of greeting cards at issue); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,
849-56 (9th Cir. 1987) (providing exhibits of restaurant layout at issue); John H. Har-
land Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 985-88 (11th Cir. 1983) (providing ex-
hibits of bank checks and carryaround cases at issue).
160. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. But see Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 126 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the court will not
look at the allegations of "the complaint in a vacuum," but instead focus on "all evi-
dence adduced at trial" including the exhibits submitted by each party).
161. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir.
1997) ("Courts will... be unable to shape narrowly-tailored relief if they do not know
what distinctive combination of ingredients deserves protection."); see also Sunbeam
Prods. Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1556 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (issuing a
preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from selling mixer that infringed the trade
dress of plaintiff's mixer). The Sunbeam court stated that the plaintiff's trade dress
consisted of:
(1) the elongated torpedo shaped main body containing the motor and elec-
tronic switch; (2) the electronic switch control being placed on the aft end of
the main body; (3) the open ended handle attached at a single location at the
front of the main body and containing a slight arc from front to rear; (4) the
tear drop chrome front face plate located on the front of the main body; (5)
the beater eject knob located on the left front portion of the handle; (6) the
black and white overall color scheme of the mixer specifically broken down
as (a) white main body; (b) chrome tear drop front face plate; (c) black open
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If a plaintiff offers only a general description of the trade dress that
she seeks to protect, courts will find that it lacks sufficient detail to
qualify as distinctive. For example, in Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger,
Lawlor, Roth, Inc.,162 the plaintiff alleged that its trade dress in greet-
ing cards consisted of "straight-on, strong photographic, glossy images
of animals, persons or objects on die-cut cards that are cut without
bleed of any kind."' 63 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff did
not have a protectable trade dress in "an idea, a concept, or a genera-
lized type of appearance." 164 The court stated that the plaintiff was
"alleging infringement of the general format of its entire line of die-
cut greeting cards.' 1 65
In addition to articulating exactly what trade dress is being in-
fringed, an artist needs to ensure that the works that are illustrative of
her style have a consistent overall look.' 66 In Walt Disney Co. v.
Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 67 the plaintiff, Walt Disney Company,
alleged that the defendant infringed the trade dress of the packaging
that it used to market its family of videocassettes called Classic
ended handle attached at the front of the main body only; (d) black beater
eject button; (e) black electronic speed control located at the aft end of the
torpedo shaped main body; and (f) black bowl platter located on the front
portion of the stand supporting the main body.
Id. at 1555. The court went on to state that
"if the Defendant was to close in the open ended portion of the top handle
on the main body, change the front tear drop face plate to a different design
and color, and relocate the electronic speed control from the rear of the unit
to the side, then there would be no infringement on the Plaintiff's trade
dress."
Id. Without narrowly tailored injunctions, vaguely worded court orders may result in
defendants not knowing what actions to take to avoid contempt charges and lead to
the dangers of anti-competitive overprotection. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 8"3,
at 8-8 to -10. The Senate, in debating the Lanham Act, expressly denied that protect-
ing trademarks would be the granting of monopolies: "[Protection of trademarks]
can be done without any misgivings and without the fear of fostering hateful monopo-
lies, for no monopoly is involved in trade-mark protection." S. Rep. No. 79-1333
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275.
162. 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995).
163. 1& at 33 (quoting Appellant's Reply Brief). The Court observed that the
plaintiff appeared to also include in its trade dress the blank interior of the cards and
the cellophane wrappers in which they were packaged. See id. at 33 n.4.
164. Id. at 32.
165. Id at 30. This is not to say that the Second Circuit found that a trade dress in
greeting cards was not possible; the court cited two other greeting card cases with
approval for their protection of "the concrete expression of an idea in a trade dress
... ." Id. at 33 (citing Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co, Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 935 (7th Cir.
1989); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1269, 1274 (10th
Cir. 1988)). For discussion of the greeting card cases, see infra Part III.B.2.
166. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382
(2d Cir. 1997) (declining to extend trade dress protection to line of outdoor furniture
because the "more detailed parts" of plaintiffs description of the trade dress applied
to some, but not all of the items in the product line).
167. 830 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
34271999]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Animated Features.168 From the outset, the district court noted that
"Disney's claim differs from most trade dress claims in that the al-
leged trade dress is not a specific package or the appearance of a sin-
gle product, but rather the overall look of a number of different
packages.' 69 In light of this difference, the court observed that Dis-
ney first had to establish that it even had a trade dress before it could
move on to the requirements of distinctiveness and likelihood of con-
fusion.1 70 The court found that the lack of a consistent look for the
packaging of the seventeen videos in the collection precluded a find-
ing of distinctiveness.17' After reviewing the elements of Disney's pu-
tative trade dress, the court concluded that while the packages had
some common elements, there was not a "consistent overall look, and
therefore the trade dress that Disney allege[d was] infringed does not
exist."172
While an artist must show that the works that are illustrative of her
style have a consistent overall look, she cannot be foreclosed from
proving a trade dress in her visual style simply because minor ele-
ments of the dress are not present in every piece. In Samara Bros.,
Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' 7' the plaintiff sought to have its trade
dress in the look of its line of children's clothes protected. 74 The
court stated that the design elements of the plaintiff's garments com-
bined to produce a "distinctive combination of ingredients" that quali-
fied the look for protection. 175 The court stated that it was not
suggesting that "in order to gain protection each garment must con-
tain identical specified design elements.' 76 Instead, the court stated
that it expects an "inevitable variation" in the items in a product
line. 1 77 While the court accepted variation in some of the elements of
168. Id. at 763.
169. Id. at 766.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 768.
172. Id. An artist may actually have several styles that identify her as the source of
her work. For example, Picasso produced work in different styles during his Blue
Period, Cubist Period, Rose Period, etc. Therefore, in examining his style for trade
dress purposes, his estate would only have to prove the distinctiveness of the style that
is deemed to be infringed by the goods in the case at bar.
173. 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998).
174. See id. at 126. The trade dress that the plaintiff sought to protect included the
typical use of
seersucker fabric; large bold appliques; large collars with the appliques gen-
erally integrated into the collar and any pockets on the garment; general
absence of printed images, black outlines, alphanumeric characters, three-
dimensional features or heavy ornamentation (such as bibs or fringe) which
are frequently used in children's clothing; and full-cut, one-piece conserva-
tive bodies.
Id.
175. Id. at 129 (quoting Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d
373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
3428 [Vol. 67
ARTIST-INSPIRED PRODUCTS
the trade dress, it ruled that an item that lacks a "major design ele-
ment" does not warrant protection. 178
2. Greeting Card Cases
Two cases involving the trade dresses of greeting cards have found
that the combination of elements used by the first creator was a
source indicator, and, therefore, entitled to protection. The holdings
of these cases provide direct support for an artist's ability to protect
her trade dress from an AIP infringer. This section examines these
cases.
a. Hartford House
The first case is Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc. 179 In
Hartford House, the plaintiff sued Hallmark for infringing the trade
dress of two of its successful lines of greeting cards."m To determine if
Hartford House had a protectable dress, the court analyzed the fea-
tures of Hartford House's greeting card lines.18' According to the
court, if the features were functional, then they could not be protected
because the usefulness of functional features in identifying the prod-
uct's source is outweighed by the public's interest in product improve-
ment by granting competitors access to those features.'t 2  In
evaluating the features of the plaintiff's lines of cards, the court did
not consider each feature separately, but instead looked at the overall
impression created by the features."n The court stated that the ulti-
178. Id.
179. 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
180. Id. at 1535.
181. The court found that the following elements comprised that look or trade
dress:
1. A two-fold card containing poetry on the first page and the third page;
2. Unprinted surfaces on the inside three panels;
3. A deckle edge on the right-side of the first page;
4. A rough edge stripe of color, or wide stripe, on the outside of the deckle
edge of the first page;
5. A high quality, uncoated and textured art paper for the cards;
6. Florescent ink for some of the colors printed on the cards;
7. Lengthy poetry, written in free verse, typically with a personal message;
8. Appearance of hand-lettered calligraphy on the first and third page with
the first letter of the words often enlarged;
9. An illustration that wraps around the card and is spread over three pages,
including the back of the card;
10. The look of the cards primarily characterized by backgrounds of soft col-
ors done with air brush blends or light watercolor strokes, usually depicting
simple contrasting foreground scenes superimposed in the background.
Id. at 1539.
182. See id. at 1537-38.
183. Id. at 1539 ("The creation and arrangement of individual product features into
a particular overall design may itself constitute a non-functional product feature.");
see also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
203-04 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding overall look of costume distinctive despite functional
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mate issue as to whether the product features are functional is
whether the configuration of features "will hinder competition or im-
pinge on the right of others to compete in the sale of goods." '184 The
court found that there were "infinite alternative designs available" to
the defendants,'85 and that it would not be difficult for the defendant
to devise distinguishing features for its competing card line. 186 Finally,
the district court held that the plaintiff had established proof of secon-
dary meaning because the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's posi-
tion in the market and had intentionally copied plaintiff's trade dress
simply to "cash in" on plaintiff's already established goodwill and
reputation. 87
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.' 88 The court restricted its decision to the issue of whether the
features of Hartford House's cards were functional.'89 The court
stated that the proper test for determining if a combination of features
is functional is "whether protection of the combination would hinder
competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effec-
tively."' 9 ° The Tenth Circuit approved of the district court's finding
that the availability of alternative designs is a "key factor" in deter-
mining that the trade dress is nonfunctional. 9' Significantly, the
Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiff "has not been granted exclusive
rights in an artistic style or in some concept, idea, or theme of expres-
sion. '" gv The court noted that the plaintiff's artwork was merely one
part of the trade dress and that the look that is being protected is the
"overall appearance of the cards."'193
Hartford House offers some obvious support to the artist seeking to
prevent manufacturers from selling AIPs using her visual style.
Clearly, an artist does not have a monopoly on the individual features
individual elements). In addition, while elements may not be distinctive by them-
selves, the court should look to the total impression of all of the elements. See Pad-
dington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993)("While each of these elements individually would not be inherently distinctive, it is
the combination of elements and the total impression that the dress gives to the ob-
server that should be the focus of a court's analysis of distinctiveness.").
184. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1540 (quoting Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v.
Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984)).
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 1542-43.
188. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
189. See id. at 1272.
190. Id. at 1273.
191. Id.; see also Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916
F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding, in a case that involved a baroque style of
silverware, that "where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trade-
mark protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of ade-
quate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such
protection").
192. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1274 (footnote omitted).
193. Id. at 1274 n.4.
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of her style. Therefore, characteristics of an artist's style, such as
broad brush strokes, bright colors, and the use of enamel paint, cannot
be protected individually. If, however, the artist can define her style
by proving a unique combination of elements, she can avoid losing her
case on the ground that what she seeks to protect is functional. In
addition, the Tenth Circuit recognized that there are many different
styles that competitors could use to sell their products in the context
of greeting cards.' 9 4 For example, a necktie manufacturer need not
use a print in a Picasso style to sell his product; he could just as easily
use the actual images of an artist whose work is in the public domain
(such as van Gogh, C6zanne, etc.). Hartford House also helps address
the issue of secondary meaning for an artist. If the artist is already
licensing her work to sell goods, the fact that a competitor copies her
dress is sufficient "in and of itself to establish secondary meaning."19
By definition, AIPs are derived from the visual artistic style of the
artist. Just as the defendant's greeting card line appeared using the
plaintiff's successful dress, AIPs almost always appear in the style of
artists who already have a successful product in the market.1 96
b. Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.
In the other case involving greeting cards, the Seventh Circuit held
that the plaintiff had proven that it had a protectable trade dress. In
Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.,'9 7 the court found that the fact that the
plaintiff's cards "incorporated common, indistinct elements such as
lines and handwriting does not refute the fact that [plaintiff's] combi-
nation of these elements was sufficiently unique to warrant trade-
dress protection."' 98 The plaintiff's demonstration of the distinctive-
ness of its cards by showing the cards to the court was sufficient to
prove distinctiveness and did not require an additional showing of sec-
ondary meaning.199 Therefore, an artist arguing for trade dress pro-
tection of her distinctive style may meet her burden of showing that
her work has a distinctive style by showing her work to the court.200
3. Cold Comfort: Romm Art
Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l., Inc.2" represents the
greatest degree of trade dress protection that a federal court has ac-
194. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
195. Hartford House, Ltd. v, Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1542 (D. Col.
1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
196. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
197. 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989).
198. Id. at 936.
199. See id. at 936-37.
200. Of course, an artist must still articulate her trade dress to the court to ensure
that her dress is recognized ab initio. See supra Part II.B.1. For examples of plaintiffs'
trade dress, see supra note 158.
201. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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corded to an artist's visual style. In Romm Art, the court held that the
plaintiffs had proven that the limited editions and fine art prints of an
artist's works were entitled to trade dress protection.2° The plaintiffs
in Romm Art were engaged in the business of distributing limited edi-
tions and fine art posters of works by the artist Tarkay. °3 Each lim-
ited edition and poster was based on an original work from the artist's
highly successful "Women and Cafes" series. 2 4 The defendants mar-
keted their own series of works that the plaintiffs alleged were "slav-
ishly similar and entirely derivative of" the "Women and Cafes"
series.2°5 After viewing the posters and the prints at issue, the court
concluded that the Tarkay trade dress identified the origin of the
items, and, therefore, met the criteria for an arbitrary or fanciful
mark.2 °6 The court went on to state that "[a] combination of visual
features that creates a distinctive visual impression is not functional
and is protectable. ' '2°7 Because the Tarkay posters and limited edi-
tions created "just such a distinctive visual impression" and the trade
dress was not functional, the court held that the Tarkay trade dress
was protectable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.208 Signifi-
cantly, the court acknowledged the importance of the holdings in
Hartford House,2°9 Harlequin Enterprises Ltd. v. Gulf & Western
Corp.,210 and Hughes v. Design Look Inc.211 in its determination that
the Tarkay trade dress was entitled to Lanham Act protection.212
While Hartford House provides a foundation for the proposition
that an artistic style can be protectable, 21 3 Romm Art goes further in
supporting that position. Hartford House concerned the overall look
of the greeting cards.214 This included the card design, that is, where
the fold was located, the kind of paper used, and the style of print
employed.215 Romm Art focuses more on the style of the artwork it-
self. The subject matter of the case concerned posters and fine art
prints, but the decision of the court did not rest on the design of these
items. In other words, the kind of paper used and the style of the
frame were not included in the plaintiff's trade dress. Instead, trade
202. See id. at 1141.
203. See id. at 1130.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1131.
206. See id. at 1136.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986), affd, 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988); see
supra notes 179-95 and accompanying text.
210. 644 F.2d 946, 948-49 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying section 43(a) to the overall fea-
tures of a book cover design).
211. 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1500-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying section 43(a) to fine art
images used in a poster calendar).
212. See Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1135.
213. See supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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dress protection was extended only to the style of the artwork itself, a
proposition denied by the Tenth Circuit in Hartford House."1 6 Romm
Art offers a great deal of support for the artist who licenses her work
to be used in connection with different items (scarves, notebooks, T-
shirts, etc.) because the style of the artwork itself is protected as a
source indicator.
Romm Art has been criticized by a federal court217 and several com-
mentators.21 8 In addition, prior to the Romm Art decision, a New
York district court had expressly rejected a section 43(a) claim similar
to the claim in Romm Art. In Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro,219 the
court held that Salvador Dali's style, which consisted of "particular
lines, unique figural constellation, colors, stylistic features and design
of a certain subject in an image created by Dali and lawfully owned by
plaintiff,"'  was not protectable under section 43(a). z1  The court
stated that the claim was properly brought under the federal copyright
statute and not the trademark statute.22
216. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
217. See Leigh v. Warner Bros., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (sug-
gesting that by mistakenly relying on dicta in the Hartford House district court opin-
ion, the Romm Art court "'confused the popularity of Tarkay the artist with the use of
the 'Tarkay look' as a product source designator.' Therefore, the Romm Art holding
is contrary to the basic tenets of trademark law." (quoting Fitzpatrick, supra note 6S,
at 464)).
218. See 1 McCarthy, supra note 71, § 8:6 n.9, at 8-20 (opining that Romm Art is a
"unique result that seriously impinges on the copyright law's policy that artistic style
is no one's exclusive property"); Bell, supra note 94, at 399 (arguing that the prints did
not deserve trade dress protection because they were inspection goods, i.e., there was
no feature of the artvork that consumers would value except its appearance, which
itself was created by the supposed trade dress); Prowda, supra note 68, at 300 (stating
that the decision is supported neither by precedent nor the works at issue); Trapha-
gen, supra note 68, at 5 (suggesting that the court confused the popularity of Tarkay
the artist with the source-indicating functions attributable to trademarks and trade
dress); Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 455-66 (faulting the Rontn Art court for summa-
rily dismissing the functionality requirement, not analyzing the specific elements of
the putative trade dress to determine distinctiveness, ruling that several of the Polar-
oid factors for proving the likelihood of confusion were established based on the same
evidence that was used to prove distinctiveness, failing to recognize that in a work of
fine art the design and the product are one in the same and not separable, and confus-
ing the popularity of Tarkay the artist with the use of the "Tarkay look" as source
designator).
219. 697 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In addition, in Hughes %,. Plumnsters, Ltd.,
1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16452, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1989), a district court decided
a case that involved the use of an image of a cat produced in the "Andy Warhol" style
(but not actually produced by Warhol) on a T-shirt with the caption "Andy Warhol's
Cat" under the image. The court held that, as a matter of law, confusion as to the
source of the artwork did not constitute confusion as to the source of the T-shirt (and
therefore, no Lanham Act violation). See id. at *4-*5. Significantly, the plaintiff did
not have a competing clothing line and the court found that likelihood of confusion
was an issue for the jury. See id
220. Galerie Furstenberg, 697 F. Supp. at 1289 (quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum).
221. See id. at 1290.
222. See id
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Romm Art's flaws, however, are not necessarily fatal to the artist
trying to stop a manufacturer from marketing an AIP using her visual
style. A major difference between the prints and posters at issue in
Romm Art and art merchandise generally is that, in the context of art
merchandise, the artistic image is a true trade dress separable from
the product. In Romm Art, the prints and posters were based on ac-
tual works of Tarkay. 23 These items, just like Tarkay's actual works,
were valued only for their aesthetic qualities." 4 That is, they had
value only in their appearance, and their appearance was comprised
solely of the putative trade dress. 2 If one were to disregard the trade
dress, there would be no discernible product remaining. In contrast,
with art merchandise, there is a separate product underlying the trade
dress. 2 6 For example, if one were to disregard the Dali print on a
duffel bag, there would still be a product (i.e., the duffel bag) underly-
ing the trade dress. In this way, the trade dress is not the product and,
instead fits comfortably under section 43(a) because it is used "in con-
nection with ... goods. 2 2 7
While concerns have been raised that Romm Art will lead to mo-
nopolies in ideas2 28 and accelerate the depletion of ideas in the public
domain, 2 9 these concerns do not properly arise in the context of art
merchandise. The argument for protecting artistic expression is not
premised upon commercial ends, but instead upon the right to free
expression.2 30 The purpose of trademark and trade dress doctrine is
to protect parties that have built up goodwill in the marketplace from
those seeking to freeride off of that goodwill and thereby reap profits
to which they are not entitled." 1 In ruling that a distinctive trade
223. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
224. See Bell, supra note 94 at 399; Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 457-58, 463.
225. See Bell, supra note 94, at 399.
226. This distinction is maintained in the context of art merchandise that is not
meant to be a proxy for the actual work of art (e.g., posters), but instead is comprised
of art attached to a discreet object. For examples of art merchandise, see supra note 4
and accompanying text.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994).
228. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 465.
229. See id. at 458.
230. See Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 19-21; Traphagen, supra note 68, at 5; Fitzpat-
rick, supra note 68, at 475-76. In the context of ensuring that trademark law does not
inhibit free expression, one commentator has stated that applying the Lanham Act to
cases involving alleged infringements of works of fine art produces a strained legal
analysis because the Lanham Act is better suited to protect interests in "nonexpensive
commercial and consumer products." Traphagen, supra note 68, at 6; see also
Brownlee, supra note 68, at 1174-75 ("The fact that trademark law seems to offer
greater protection to art produced more for commercial reasons than simply 'for art's
sake' is not surprising, because the goals of trademark law are primarily the protec-
tion of business goodwill and safeguarding consumers against deception.").
231. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Vuitton Et Fils
S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding liability
where defendant Young "as the imitator, is appropriating Vuitton's reputation in the
marketplace for Young's own purpose and gain.... By choosing to appropriate Vuit-
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dress in a consumer product is protectable, courts have found that
there are enough trade dress alternatives available such that competi-
tion in the market will not be foreclosed. 2  Therefore, protecting an
owner's trade dress does not prevent other parties from effectively
competing in the market.233 Accordingly, a manufacturer of an AIP
need not use an image in the style of an artist who already has a mar-
ket presence to sell merchandise.3' In addition, this point also ad-
dresses the issue that trade dress protection will overprotect
commercial artists to the detriment of artists who choose not to work
in such a setting.3 5 As trade dress only seeks to protect parties in
commerce, artists who seek trade dress protection for their visual style
ton's decorative design, Young appears to be attempting to piggyback on Vuitton's
trademark and the reputation it has acquired in the marketplace . . ").
232. See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1006 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that defendant did not make the required showing to prove functionality of plaintiffs
sweater design because it has "adduced no evidence whatsoever that the number of
designs available for 'fall motif sweaters is limited"); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hall-
mark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that "the availability
of alternative appealing designs is a key factor in determining that a trade dress is
nonfunctional" because "[t]his is not a case where there are a limited number of de-
signs available ...."). As the Ninth Circuit has observed:
Nothing prevents [the defendant] from constructing or manufacturing its
own similar line of luggage with its own unique trademark, and marketing
that line without confusing the public about the origin and manufacturer of
the goods.... Competition is not hindered by requiring [the defendant] to
develop its own distinctive design for use in the decoration of its manufac-
tured products....
Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 777.
233. If the use of a certain aesthetic trade dress is necessary to effectively compete
in a market, then the dress is deemed to be "functional" and is not protectable. See
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1952) (finding "Ba-
roqu&" style of china was functional). But see Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. God-
inger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (criticizing Pagliero for
"overbreadth" in its formulation of the aesthetic functionality doctrine and, instead,
requiring a "finding of foreclosure of alternatives" before trademark protection is
denied); Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 774 ("The policy expressed in Pagiero and the cases
decided under it is aimed at avoiding the use of a trademark to monopolize a design
feature which, in itself and apart from its identification of source, improves the useful-
ness or appeal of the object it adorns."). A feature of a product is not per se func-
tional just because it contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of a product.
See Vuitton, 644 F.2d at 773.
234. See Knitvaves, 71 F.3d at 1006 (stating that plaintiff's use of squirrels and
leaves in a fall motif on its sweaters did not limit defendant's ability to create alterna-
tive designs in a fall motif; plaintiff was only entitled to protection from defendant
creating designs so similar as to create a likelihood of confusion). Professor Ginsburg
suggests that a manufacturer marketing a wastebasket with a "Matisse-inspired de-
sign" may claim that the product makes a statement about the value of "not-so-mod-
ern" art that is widely accepted by the contemporary middle class. See Ginsburg,
supra note 69, at 21. She concludes that where the context of the item is "mass com-
mercial," the item's identity as merchandise will predominate over considerations for
free expression and the manufacturer will be subject to trademark and unfair compe-
tition laws. See id
235. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 68, at 474-75.
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as used in art merchandise will not be able to prevent other artists
who may incorporate the artist's style in their own fine artworks.
There is yet another distinction between Romm Art and art mer-
chandise. Trademark doctrine protects against the confusion of "the
average purchaser. '' 236 Purchasers of fine art will likely be informed,
sophisticated parties capable of discerning similar styles. In contrast,
purchasers of art merchandise are likely to be less informed and there-
fore more likely to be deceived in the marketplace. 7 Protecting pur-
chasers of art merchandise is, therefore, consistent with the protection
from confusion that trademark law seeks to accomplish.23
4. Further Refinement of Source Identification
Some courts have drawn a distinction between trade dress cases
that deal with product packaging and those that deal with product de-
sign and configuration." 9 Most significant of those cases in the con-
text of protecting visual artistic style is Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs
Ltd.24° In Knitwaves, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of sweaters that
were decorated with leaves, squirrels, and other fall motifs. 24t The
236. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th
Cir. 1963). The court stated that "[tihe law is not made for the protection of experts,
but for the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking
and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are gov-
erned by appearance and general impressions." Id. at 156 (quoting Stork Restaurant
v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948)).
237. This argument relates directly to the last Polaroid factor, regarding the sophis-
tication of buyers in the marketplace. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Polaroid
factors); see also Brownlee, supra note 68, at 1174 (arguing that trademark law will
protect "artists who mass produce art for commercial resale" more than artists who
produce fine art because the observers and consumers of mass produced art have
considerably less expertise in discerning differences in the constituent works and
would be more likely to be confused as to the origin of the works).
238. For discussion of the confusion requirement of a claim under the Lanham Act,
see infra Part III.C.
239. Most significant of these cases is Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterps.,
Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994). In Duraco, the Third Circuit held that in cases of
product configuration, the Abercrombie taxonomy for determining distinctiveness is
inapplicable and instead, in order for a trade dress to be inherently distinctive, it
"must be (i) unusual and memorable; (ii) conceptually separable from the product;
and (iii) likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product." Id. at 1449.
Duraco has not been adopted by other circuits. See, e.g., Knitvaves, 71 F.3d at 1009
n.6 (recognizing the reasoning of the Duraco court in distinguishing between product
features and product packaging, but expressly declining to apply the Duraco court's
three part test); Stuart Hall Co., v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780, 787 (8th Cir. 1995)
(stating that trade dress is a single concept encompassing both product configuration
and product packaging and expressly declining to adopt the Duraco standard). In
addition, determining precisely where the packaging ends and the product begins can
be dispositive. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379
(2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]his circuit appears to be moving toward a rule that packaging is
usually indicative of a product's source, while the design or configuration of the prod-
uct is usually not so.").
240. 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
241. See id. at 999-1001.
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Second Circuit held that where the trade dress is not product packag-
ing, but instead consists of product features, the Abercrombie catego-
ries are not applied to determine distinctiveness.24 2 Instead, the
proper inquiry is whether the trade dress is "likely to serve primarily
as a designator of origin of the product. 24 3 The court held that "since
the primary purpose of [plaintiff's] sweater designs is aesthetic rather
than source-identifying, [plaintiff's] sweater designs do not meet the
first requirement of an action under [section] 43(a) of the Lanham
Act-that they be used as a mark to identify or distinguish the
source."
2 4
In Mulberry Thai Silks, Inc., v. K & K Neckwear, Inc.,.45 the district
court considered the plaintiff's claim of trade dress infringement with
respect to his line of neckties that he designed in-house and had pro-
duced by outside textile manufacturers.246 The court found that "the
design of the fabric used in a necktie is not suggestive of the product
or its source at all-in a fundamental sense it is the product itself."2 47
The court expressly refused to apply either the Abercrombie or the
Duraco tests, but it did observe that "two designs may be sufficiently
similar to be mistaken, one for the other, without either design being
associated with any particular source."2' In such a situation, there is
not a protectable trade dress.
Knitwaves and Mulberry Thai Silks raise an important issue for the
artist seeking to keep AIPs using her style off of the market. The
artist must establish that the style of her work on the product is not
merely indicative of source, but primarily indicative of source. In Sa-
mara Bros.,2 49 however, the Second Circuit distinguished the aesthetic
elements of the Knitwaves sweaters from the design elements making
up the Samara trade dress. The court recognized Samara's intent to
use consistent design elements to create a look that would be identi-
fied with the company and thereby build brand loyolty.250 The court
242. See id. at 1007. In a later case, the Second Circuit held that the Abercrombie
analysis continued to apply to product packaging cases. See Fun-Damental Too, Ltd.
v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1997).
243. Knitwaves, 71 F-3d at 1008 (quoting Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449).
244. Id. at 1006. Accord Banff Ltd. v. Express, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1071
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (interpreting Knitwaves, in another sweater case, as requiring that "a
plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that the appearance of its product serves
some source identifying function. It must demonstrate that the primary purpose be-
hind the design was to identify its product's source.").
245. 897 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
246. The court described the dress that the plaintiff was seeking to protect as not
more than its "particular use of bright colors and geometric patterns, in an industry in
which the use of such design elements is common." Id. at 797. Accordingly, the court
found that the dress was not inherently distinctive. See id.
247. Id at 793.
248. Id. at 797.
249. 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 173-
78 and accompanying text.
250. 165 F.3d at 125.
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also stated that Samara's product line was its core business and the
"lifeblood of the company."25' 1 The court went on to state that the
two sweaters at issue in Knitwaves had never before been manufac-
tured by the Knitwaves nor was there an intent on the part of
Knitwaves to establish the "fall motif" as its core product in the mar-
ketplace. 2 Clearly, under this decision, an artist seeking to protect a
visual style that is used most successfully in connection with the sale of
goods is in a better position than if the style she seeks to protect does
not have proven marketability or was not used by the artist to build
identity recognition in the marketplace.
At this point, a distinction can be drawn between the aesthetic
value of works of fine art and the aesthetic value of works used in
connection with art merchandise. Works of fine art are valued for
their aesthetic qualities.3 Under the Knitwaves doctrine, it seems
impossible that an artist would be able to obtain trade dress protec-
tion for a visual style employed to create a work of art.2 5 4 This is
obvious because the trade dress is adopted for its aesthetic properties
and was not adopted primarily for the purposes of identifying its
source. The images of art on art merchandise, however, have signifi-
cantly less aesthetic appeal than the actual works themselves. Images
of works of art are wrapped around coffee mugs, shrunken down to fit
onto the faces of wristwatches, and cropped to fit onto neckties and
other odd shaped objects. This process of visual distortion reduces the
aesthetic value of these images and gets to the heart of why the images
were chosen in the first place. They are used to make an association.
For art merchandise, the drawing power of the product is the associa-
tion with the artist. 55 The primary purpose of the image is to identify
the artist and associate the artist with the product. 56 In this way, the
association with the artist is primary and the aesthetic value of the
image is secondary.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text.
255. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing, in a case that involved the trade dress of a toy, that there was no doubt that
consumers wanted the toy in part because they identified it with the television series
in which it was featured). Even the way in which one refers to art merchandise is
evidence of the association made between the artist and the item, e.g., Caillebotte
umbrellas, Monet neckties, etc. For additional examples, see supra notes 5-12 and
accompanying text.
256. To the extent that the mark "increases consumer appeal only because of the
quality associated with [the] goods, or because of the prestige associated with owning
a genuine [article], then the design is serving the legitimate function of a trademark; it
is identifying the source of the product, and thus should be protected." Vuitton Et Fils
S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 1981).
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C. Step Two: Likelihood of Confiision
In the context of art merchandise, a potential purchaser could see
the defendant manufacturer's AIP and believe, by virtue of the visual
style, that the AIP is sponsored by the plaintiff.257 This form of confu-
sion exists most obviously when a potential customer views products
on a store shelf. If the manufacturer of an AlP can get a potential
purchaser to look at his merchandise, which she would otherwise not
consider purchasing, by using the visual style of an inspiring artist,
then he has created the kind of confusion that is proscribed by this
doctrine. Labels and hangtags on the merchandise do not change the
fact that the AIP manufacturer has caused confusion by getting the
potential purchaser to look at his goods and investigate further.25s
A second kind of confusion does not emphasize the effect on poten-
tial purchasers, but, instead, looks to the effect on third parties that
see the article in use by a purchaser. 9 This principle easily applies to
AIPs. Even if the purchaser is not confused as to the source of the
article that she is buying because of the packaging or labeling,2 60 she
invariably removes such designations after she purchases the article.
Therefore, even if a scarf comes with a tag that says, "apres Dali," and
the purchaser easily sees it, the manufacturer of the AIP can still
cause confusion. When the purchaser wears the scarf, those who see
her wearing it are likely to be confused, believing that the scarf depicts
a Dali image. In this way, the purchaser has the prestige of wearing a
Dali scarf when she has not actually purchased one.261
CONCLUSION
The art merchandise industry is becoming increasingly competitive.
As the amount of art licensing increases and art merchandise becomes
available in almost every possible form, the incentive grows for manu-
facturers to avoid the formal process of licensing artists' images.
While artists are becoming more protective of their reputations, some
manufacturers are resorting to producing AIPs in the visual styles of
artists who already have a presence in the market.
257. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
258. See infra note 260.
259. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
260. The use of labels alone cannot insulate an infringer from liability for consumer
confusion. See Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir.
1998) ("We do not mean to intimate that the distinctive elements of any trade dress
may be freely appropriated as long as the junior user clearly identifies the source of
the goods." (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeiI-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033,
1047 (2d Cir. 1992))); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Vest Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 259 (5th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1795 (1998) ("While we have recognized that labels
may dispel consumer confusion, under appropriate circumstances, we have never held
that this is an absolute affirmative defense to every trademark infringement claim.").
261. See United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving knockoffs
of Rolex watches that a casual observer would likely believe to be genuine articles).
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By availing herself of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, an artist can
make a case for trade dress infringement of her visual style as used in
connection with art merchandise. The direction of recent trade dress
cases supports the artist's claim that her visual style, when used in
connection with art merchandise, is a trade dress indicative of source.
Despite the weaknesses in the Romm Art decision, an artist can still
make a case that her style is distinctive. As there are alternative prod-
uct designs available to the AIP manufacturer, an artist's style will not
be found to be functional. In addition, while works of fine art are
valued solely for their aesthetic qualities, the use of an artist's image
on art merchandise has less aesthetic value and can be source-indicat-
ing. When an AIP manufacturer uses the artist's style to market his
own goods, he is likely to confuse the purchasing public and the casual
observer into believing that his AIP is sponsored by or associated with
the artist. In this manner, the AIP manufacturer freerides off of the
artist's goodwill and infringes the artist's right to control the use of the
reputation she has built up over her career.
